Abstract-Differential Privacy (DP) has received increasing attention as a rigorous privacy framework. Many existing studies employ traditional DP mechanisms (e.g., the Laplace mechanism) as primitives to continuously release private data for protecting privacy at each time point (i.e., event-level privacy), which assume that the data at different time points are independent, or that adversaries do not have knowledge of correlation between data. However, continuously generated data tend to be temporally correlated, and such correlations can be acquired by adversaries. In this paper, we investigate the potential privacy loss of a traditional DP mechanism under temporal correlations. First, we analyze the privacy leakage of a DP mechanism when adversaries have knowledge of such temporal correlations. Our analysis reveals that, the event-level privacy loss of a DP mechanism may increase over time, while the user-level privacy is as expected. We call the unexpected privacy loss temporal privacy leakage (TPL). Second, we design efficient algorithms for quantifying TPL. Although TPL may increase over time, we find that its supremum may exist in some cases. Third, we propose mechanisms that convert any existing DP mechanism into one against temporal privacy leakage. Experiments confirm that our approach is efficient and effective.
INTRODUCTION
W ITH the development of wearable and mobile devices, vast amount of temporal data generated by individuals are being collected, such as trajectories and web page click streams. The continuous publication of statistics from these temporal data has the potential for significant social benefits such as disease surveillance , real-time traffic monitoring and web mining. However, privacy concerns hinder the wider use of these data. To this end, differential privacy under continual observation [1] [7] [8] has received increasing attention because it provides a rigorous privacy guarantee. Intuitively, differential privacy (DP) [9] ensures that the change of any single user's data has a "slight" (bounded in ) impact on the change in outputs. The parameter is defined to be a positive real number to control the privacy level. Larger values of result in larger privacy leakage. However, most existing works on differentially private continuous aggregate release assume data at different time points are independent, or attackers do not have knowledge of correlation between data. Example 1 shows that temporal correlations may degrade the expected privacy guarantee of DP.
Example 1.
Consider the scenario of continuous data release with DP illustrated in Figure 1 . A trusted server collects users' locations at each time point in Figure 1 (a) and continuously publishes differentially private aggregates (i.e., the counts of people at each location). Suppose that each user appears at only one location at Manuscript received XXX; revised XXX. each time point. According to the Laplace mechanism [10] , adding Lap(1/ ) noise 1 to perturb each count in Figure1(c) can achieve -DP at each time point. However, the expected privacy guarantee may decay due to temporal correlations as follows. Using auxiliary information, such as road networks, an attacker may know users' mobility patterns, such as "always arriving at loc 5 after visiting loc 4 " (shown in Figure 1(b) ), leading to the patterns illustrated in solid lines of Figure 1 (c). The temporal correlation due to this road network can be represented as Pr(l t = loc 5 |l t−1 = loc 4 ) = 1 for t ∈ [2, 3] where l t is the location of a user at time t. That is, given the previous counts of loc 4 , an attacker can derive the current count of loc 5 . Consequently, after releasing private count of loc 5 at time 2, the privacy guarantee of the private count of loc 4 at time 1 may not be -DP as expected; instead, it is 2 -DP because the attacker knows true counts of loc 4 and loc 5 are the same (i.e., as if the same count is released two times). Furthermore, let us consider an extreme case of temporal correlation Pr(l t = loc 4 |l t−1 = loc 4 ) = Pr(l t = loc 5 |l t−1 = loc 5 ) = 1 for t ∈ [2, T ], i.e., the counts of loc 4 and loc 5 will not change in [1, T ] , such as a terrible traffic congestion. Then, after releasing T counts by adding Lap(1/ ) at each time point, the privacy guarantee of private count of loc 4 and loc 5 at time 1 is T -DP (i.e., as if the same count is released T times).
It is reasonable to consider that adversaries may obtain the temporal correlations, which commonly exist in our real life and are easily acquired from public information or historical data. In addition to road networks, there are countless factors that may cause temporal correlations such as the common patterns characterizing human activities [11] and weather conditions [12] .
Few studies in the literature investigated such potential privacy loss of event-level -DP under temporal correlations as shown in Example 1. A direct method (without finely utilizing the probability of correlation) involves amplifying the perturbation in terms of group differential privacy [13] [10], i.e., protecting the correlated data as a group. In Example 1, for temporal correlation Pr(l t = loc 5 |l t−1 = loc 4 ) = 1, we can protect the counts of loc 4 at time t − 1 and loc 5 at time t in a group (the sensitivity becomes 2) by increasing the scale of the perturbation to Lap(2/ ) at each time point; for temporal correlation Pr(l t = loc i |l t−1 = loc i ) = 1, in order to guarantee -DP at time 1, we need to add Lap(T / ) noise at each time point because the privacy leakage accumulates over time. However, this technique is not suitable for probabilistic correlations to finely prevent privacy leakage and may over-perturb the data as a result. For example, regardless of whether Pr(l t = loc i |l t−1 = loc i ) is 1 or 0.1, it always protects the correlated data in a bundle.
Although a few studies investigated the issue of differential privacy under probabilistic correlations, they are not applicable for continuous data release because of the different problem settings. The following two works focused on useruser correlations rather than temporal correlations. Yang et al. [14] proposed Bayesian differential privacy, which measures the privacy leakage under probabilistic correlations between tuples, modeled by a Gaussian Markov Random Field without taking time factor into account. Liu et al. [15] proposed dependent differential privacy by introducing two parameters of dependence size and probabilistic dependence relationship between tuples. However, it is not clear whether we can specify them for temporally correlated data and how to quantify the privacy guarantee. Another line of work [16] [17] has investigated adversaries with knowledge of temporal correlations. They focused on designing new mechanisms for protecting a single user's location privacy extending DP, whereas we attempt to quantify the potential privacy loss of a traditional DP mechanism in the context of continuous data release.
We call the adversary considered in traditional DP with additional knowledge of probabilistic temporal correlations adversary T . Rigorously quantifying and bounding the privacy leakage against adversary T remains a challenge. Therefore, our goal in this paper is to solve the following problems:
• How do we formalize adversary T and analyze the privacy loss against adversary T ? (Section 3)
• How do we calculate the privacy loss against adversary T ? (Section 4)
• How do we bound the privacy loss against adversary T ? (Section 5)
Contributions
In this work, we quantify and bound the privacy leakage of a DP mechanism due to temporal correlations. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
First, we rigorously define adversary T with temporal correlations that are described by the commonly used Markov model. The temporal correlations include backward and forward correlations, i.e., Pr(l denotes the value (e.g., location) of user i at time t. We then define Temporal Privacy Leakage (TPL) as the privacy loss of a DP mechanism at time t against adversary T . TPL includes two parts: Backward Privacy Leakage (BPL) and Forward Privacy leakage (FPL) due to the existence of backward and forward temporal correlations. Our analysis shows that BPL may accumulates from previous privacy leakage and FPL increases with future release. Intuitively, BPL at time t is affected by previously releases at time 1 to t − 1, and FPL at time t will be affected by future releases at time t + 1 to T , which is the final time point of the release. We define α-differential privacy under temporal correlation, denoted as α-DP T , to formalize the privacy guarantee of a DP mechanism against adversary T , i.e., the temporal privacy leakage should be bounded in α. We prove a new form of sequential composition theorem for α-DPT (different from the traditional sequential composition [18] for -DP).
Second, we efficiently calculate the temporal privacy leakage under given backward and forward temporal correlations. We transform the calculation of temporal privacy leakage into finding an optimal solution of a linear-fractional programming problem. This type of problem can be solved by well-studied methods, e.g., simplex algorithm, in exponential time. By exploiting the constraints of this problem, we propose fast algorithms to calculate the temporal privacy leakage efficiently.
Third, we design privacy budget allocation schemes that can be used to convert a traditional DP mechanism into one satisfying α-DP T . A challenge is that the temporal privacy leakage may increase over time so that α-DP T is hard to achieve when the length of release time T is unknown. In our first solution, we prove that the supremum of TPL may exist in some cases, and we can allocate appropriate privacy budgets to make sure the increased TPL will never be greater than α, no matter how long the T is. However, when T is too short for the accumulation of temporal privacy leakage to result in a significant increase, we may over-perturb the data. In our second solution, we design another budget allocation scheme that exactly achieve α-DP T at each time point.
Finally, experiments with synthetic data confirm the efficiency and effectiveness of our privacy leakage quantification algorithm. We also demonstrate the impact of different degree of temporal correlations on privacy leakage.
PRELIMINARIES

Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [9] is a formal definition of data privacy. Let D be a database and D be a copy of D that is different in any one tuple. D and D are neighboring databases. A differentially private output from D or D should exhibit little difference. 
Definition 1 ( -DP
The parameter , called the privacy budget, represents the degree of privacy offered. Intuitively, a lower value of implies stronger privacy guarantee and a larger perturbation noise, and a higher value of implies a weaker privacy guarantee while possibly achieving higher accuracy. A commonly used method to achieve -DP is the Laplace mechanism, which adds random noise drawn from a Laplace distribution into the aggregates to be published.
We can achieve -DP by adding Laplace noise with scale ∆/ , i.e., Lap(∆/ ).
Privacy Leakage
Let us first discuss the adversaries tolerated by differential privacy, and then formalize privacy leakage w.r.t. such adversaries. Differential privacy is able to protect against the attackers who even have knowledge of all users' data in the database except the one of the targeted victim [19] . Let i ∈ U be a user in the database D. Let A i be an adversary who targets user i and has knowledge of DK = D − {li} where li ∈ [loc1, . . . , locn] denotes the data of user i. The adversary A i observes the private output r and attempts to guess whether the possible value of user i is locj or loc k where locj, loc k ∈ [loc1, . . . , locn]. We define the privacy leakage of a DP mechanism as follows.
Definition 2 (Privacy Leakage of a DP mechanism against A i ). Let U be a set of users in the database. Let A i be an adversary who targets user i and knows all the tuples in the database except the one of user i. The privacy leakage of a differentially private mechanism M against one A i and all A i , i ∈ U are defined, respectively, as follows in which l i and l i are two different possible values of user i's data.
In other words, the privacy budget of a DP mechanism can be considered as a metric of privacy leakage. The larger , the larger the privacy leakage. Hence, we can say that M satisfies -DP if P L0(M) ≤ . We note that a -DP mechanism automatically satisfies -DP if < . For convenience, in the rest of this paper, when we say that M satisfies -DP, we mean that the supremum of privacy leakage is .
Problem Setting
We attempt to quantify the potential privacy loss of a DP mechanism under temporal correlations in the context of continuous data release (e.g., releasing private counts at each time as shown in Figure 1 ). Users in the database, denoted by U , are generating data continuously. Let loc = {loc1, . . . , locn} be all possible values of user's data. We denote the value of user i at time t by l t i . A trusted server collects the data of each user into the database
|U | } at each time t (e.g., the columns in Figure  1(a) ). A DP mechanism M t releases differentially private output r t independently at each time t. Our goal is to quantify and bound the potential privacy loss of M t against adversaries with knowledge of temporal correlations. We note that while we use location data in Example 1, the problem setting is general for temporally correlated data.
Our problem setting is identical to differential privacy under continual observation in the literature [ [5] . The former protects each user's single data point at time t (i.e., the neighboring databases are D t and D t ), whereas the latter protects the presence of a user with all her data on the timeline (i.e., the neighboring databases are
In this work, we start from examining event-level DP under temporal correlations, and we also extend the discussion to user-level DP by studying the composability of the privacy leakage.
ANALYZING PRIVACY LEAKAGE
In the following, we first formalize adversary with temporal correlations in Section 3.1. We then define and analyze temporal privacy leakage in Section 3.2. We provide a new privacy notion of α-DP T against temporal privacy leakage and prove its composability in Section 3.3. Finally, we make a few important observations in Section 3.4.
Adversay with Knowledge of Temporal Correlations
Markov Chain for Temporal Correlations. The Markov chain (MC) is extensively used in modeling user mobility profiles [11] [20] [16] . For a time-homogeneous first-order MC, a user's current value only depends on the previous one. The parameter of the MC is the transition matrix, which describes the probabilities for transition between values. The sum of the probabilities in each row of the transition matrix is 1. A concrete example of transition matrix and time-reversed one for location data is shown in Figure 2 . As shown in Figure 2 (a), if user i is at loc 1 now (time t); then, the probability of coming from loc 3 (time t − 1) is 0.7, namely, Pr(l Figure  2 (b), if user i was at loc 3 at the previous time t − 1, then the probability of being at loc 1 now (time t) is 0.6; namely,
t−1 i = loc3) = 0.6. We call the transition matrices in Figure 2 ), respectively. It is reasonable to consider that the backward and/or forward temporal correlations could be acquired by adversaries. For example, the adversaries can learn them from user's historical trajectories (or the reversed trajectories) by well studied methods such as Maximum Likelihood 
We first analyze TPL(A T i , M t ) (i.e., Equation (2)) because it is key to solve Equation (3) or (4). We can rewrite
backward privacy leakage
forward privacy leakage
It is clear that 
Definition 7 (Forward Privacy Leakage, FPL 
By substituting Equation (6) and (8) into (5), we have
Since the privacy leakage is considered as the worst case among all users in the database, by Equations (7) and (9), we have
Intuitively, BPL, FPL and TPL are the privacy leakage w.r.t. the adversaries
, respectively. In Equation (11), we need to minus P L 0 (M t ) because it is counted in both BPL and FPL. In the following, we will dive into the analysis of BPL and FPL. BPL over time. For BPL, we first expand and simplify Equation (6) by Bayesian theorem and Lemma 1,
We now discuss the three annotated terms in the above equation. The first term indicates BPL at the previous time t − 1, the second term is the backward temporal correlation determined by P B i , and the third term is equal to the privacy leakage w.r.t. adversaries in traditional DP (see Definition 2). Hence, BPL at time t depends on (i) BPL at time t−1, (ii) the backward temporal correlations, and (iii) the (traditional) privacy leakage of M t (which is related to the privacy budget allocated to M t ). By Equation (12), we know that
is a backward temporal privacy loss function for calculating the accumulated privacy loss.
Equation (13) reveals that BPL is calculated recursively and may accumulate over time, as shown in Example 2 ( Fig.3(a) ).
Example 2 (BPL due to previous releases).
Suppose that a DP mechanism M t satisfies PL0(M t ) = 0.1 for each time t ∈ [1, T ], i.e., 0.1-DP at each time point. We now discuss BPL at each time point w.r.t. A 
Hence, the continuous data release
t is equivalent to releasing the same database multiple times; the privacy leakage at each time point will accumulate from previous time points and increase linearly (the red line with circle marker in Figure 3 (a)). In another extreme case, if there is no backward temporal correlation that is known to A ), the adversary cannot derive l
By Equation (14), we know that
is a forward temporal privacy loss function for calculating the increased privacy loss due to FPL at the next time.
Equation (15) reveals that FPL is calculated recursively and may increase over time, as shown in Example 3 ( Fig.3(b) ).
Example 3 (FPL due to future releases).
Considering the same setting in Example 2, we now discuss FPL at each time point w.r.t. A T i with knowledge of forward temporal correlations P F i . In an extreme case, if P F i indicates the strongest correlation, say,
Hence, the continuous data release r t , . . . , r T is equivalent to releasing the same database multiple times; the privacy leakage at time t will increase when every time new release (i.e., r t+1 ,r t+2 ,...) happens, as shown in the red line with circle marker in Figure  3 (a). We see that contrary to BPL, the FPL at time 1 is the highest (due to future releases at time 1 to 10) while FPL at time 10 is the lowest (since there is no future release with respect to time 10 yet). If r 11 is released, all FPL at time t ∈ [1, 10] will be updated. In another extreme case, if there is no forward temporal correlation that is known to A T i (e.g., for the A i in Definition 2 or
then the forward privacy leakage at each time point is PL 0 (M t ), as shown in the black line with rectangle marker Figure 3 (10) and (11). Figure 3 (c) shows TPL, which can be calculated using Equation (11).
α-DP T and Its Composability
In this section, we define α-DP T (differential privacy under temporal correlations) to provide a privacy guarantee against temporal privacy leakage. We prove its sequential composition theorem and discuss the connection between α-DP T and -DP in terms of event-level/user-level privacy [4] [5] and w-event privacy [7] . Definition 8 (α-DP T , differential privacy under temporal correlations). If TPL of M t (see Definition 5) is less than or equal to α, we say that M t satisfies α-differential privacy under temporal correxlation, denoted by α-DPT .
DPT is an enhanced version of DP on temporal data. If the data are temporally independent (i.e., for all user i, both P B i
and P F i are ∅), an -DP mechanism satisfies -DP T . If the data are temporally correlated (i.e., existing user i whose P
B i
or P F i is not ∅), an -DP mechanism satisfies α-DP T where α is the increased privacy leakage and can be quantified in our framework.
One may wonder, for a sequence of DP T mechanisms on the timeline, what is the overall privacy guarantee. Suppose that M t satisfies t -DP and poses risks of BPL and FPL as α B t and α F t , respectively. That is,
at time t according to Equation (11) . We formally define such overall privacy leakage based on Equation (4).
Definition 9 (TPL of a sequence of DP mechanisms).
The temporal privacy leakage of DP mechanisms {M t , . . . , M t+j } where j ≥ 0 is defined as follows.
It is easy to see that, if j = 0, it is event-level privacy; if t = 1 and j = T − 1, it is user-level privacy.
Theorem 2 (Sequential Composition under Temporal Correlations).
A sequence of DP mechanism {M t , . . . , M t+j } satisfies
t+k -DP T j ≥ 2 (16) When t = 1 and j = T − 1 in Theorem 2, we have Corollary
. Hence, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1.
The temporal privacy leakage of a combined mecha-
k=T k=1 k . It shows that temporal correlations do not affect the userlevel privacy (i.e., protecting all the data on the timeline of each user), which is in line with the idea of group differential privacy: protecting all the correlated data in a bundle.
Comparison between DP and DP T . As we mentioned in Section 2.3, there are typically two privacy notions in continuous data release: event-level and user-level [4] [5] . Recently, w-event privacy [7] is proposed to merge the gap between event-level and user-level privacy. It protects the data in any w-length sliding window by utilizing the sequential composition theorem of DP.
Theorem 3 (Sequential composition on independent data [18]). Suppose that
Suppose that M t satisfies -DP for each t ∈ [1, T ]. According to Theorem 3, it achieves T -DP on user-level and w -DP on w-event level. We compare the privacy guarantee of M t on independent data and temporally correlated data in Table 1.   TABLE 1 The privacy guarantee of -DP mechanisms on different types of data.
Privacy Notion
Data independent temporally correlated
w-event [7] w -DP see Theorem 2 user-level [4] [5]
T -DP T -DP T (by Corollary 1) It reveals that temporal correlations may blur the boundary between event-level privacy and user-level privacy. For example, in an extreme case, the temporal privacy leakage of an -DP mechanism on event-level can be T , i.e., T -DP T . Consider the examples shown in Figure 3 . Under the strongest temporal correlations, M 10 satisfies 1-DP T on event-level and a combined mechanism {M 1 , . . . , M 10 } also satisfies 1-DP T on user-level. Essentially, it is because the adversaries may infer {D
t (event-level) using temporal correlations. We conclude that, the privacy loss of event-level privacy may increase over time, while the privacy guarantee of user-level privacy is as expected.
Discussion
We make a few important observations regarding our privacy analysis. First, the temporal privacy leakage is defined in a personalized way. That is, the privacy leakage may be different for users with distinct temporal patterns (i.e., P B i and P F i ). We define the overall temporal privacy leakage as the maximum one for all users, so that α-DP T is compatible with the traditional -DP mechanism (using one parameter to represent the overall privacy level) and we can convert a traditional DP mechanism to bound the temporal privacy leakage. On the other hand, our definitions also can be compatible with personalized differential privacy (PDP) mechanisms [21] , in which the personalized privacy budgets, i.e., a vector [ 1 , . . . , n], are allocated to each user. In other words, we can convert a PDP mechanism to bound the temporal privacy leakage for each user.
Second, in this paper, we focus on the temporally correlated data and assume that the adversary has knowledge of temporal correlations modeled by Markov chain. However, it is possible that the adversary has knowledge about more sophisticated temporal correlation model or other types of correlations, such as user-user correlations modeled by Gaussian Markov Random Field in [14] . Our contributions in this work can serve as primitives for quantifying the privacy risk under more advanced adversarial knowledge.
CALCULATING TEMPORAL PRIVACY LEAKAGE
In this section, we design algorithms for computing backward privacy leakage (BPL) and forward privacy leakage (FPL). We first show that both of them can be transformed to the optimal solution of a linear-fractional programming problem [22] in Section 4.1. Traditionally, this type of problem can be solved by simplex algorithm [23] in exponential time. By exploiting the constraints in this problem, we then design a polynomial algorithm to calculate it in Section 4.2. Further, based on our observation of some repeated computation when the polynomial algorithm runs on different time points, we precompute such common results and design quasi-quadratic and sub-linear algorithms for calculating temporal privacy leakage at each time point in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4, respectively.
Problem formulation
According to the privacy analysis of BPL and FPL in Section 3.2, we need to solve the backward and forward temporal privacy loss functions L B (·) and L F (·) in Equations (13) and (15), respectively. By observing the structure of the first term in Equations (12) and (14), we can see that the calculations for recursive functions L B (·) and L F (·) are virtually in the same way. They calculate the increment of the input values (the previous BPL or the next FPL) based on temporal correlations (backward or forward). Although different degree of correlations result in different privacy loss functions, the methods for analyzing them are the same.
We now quantitatively analyze the temporal privacy leakage. In the following, we demonstrate the calculation of L B (·), i.e., the first term of Equation (12).
We now simplify the notations in the above formula. Let two arbitrary (distinct) rows in P B i be vectors q = (q 1 , ..., qn) and d = (d 1 , ..., dn). For example, suppose that q is the first row in the transition matrix of Figure 2(b) ; then, the elements in q are:
etc. Let x = (x 1 , ..., xn) T be a vector whose elements indicate
e.g., x 1 denotes Pr(r 1 , ..., r t−1 |l
We obtain the following by expanding l
Next, we formalize the objective function and constraints. Suppose that BPL(A
According to the definition of BPL (as the supremum), for any x j , x k ∈ x, we have e (19) subject to e
where xj ,
The above is a form of Linear-Fractional Programming [22] (i.e., LFP), where the objective function is a ratio of two linear functions and the constraints are linear inequalities or equations. A linear-fractional programming problem can be converted into a sequence of linear programming problems [22] and then solved using the simplex algorithm [23] 
Polynomial Algorithm
Bounding the objective function by the contraints. We now investigate the structure of constraints in order to design a more efficient method to solve this LFP. From Inequalities (20) and (21), we know that the feasible region of the constraints are not empty and bounded; hence, the optimal solution exists. We prove Theorem 4, which enables the optimal solution to be found in time O(n 2 ).
We first define some notations that will be frequently used in our theorems. Suppose that the variable vector x consists of two parts (subsets): .
According to Equation (18) , the increment of temporal privacy loss, i.e., L(·), is the maximum value among the n(n − 1) LFP problems, which are defined by different 2-permutations q and d chosen from n rows of P i . (22) and (23) are sufficient conditions for obtaining such optimal value. Corollary 2 gives a necessary condition for satisfying Inequalities (22) and (23) . Based on the above analysis, we design Algorithm 1 for computing BPL or FPL.
Algorithm design. According to the definition of BPL and FPL, we need to find the maximum privacy leakage (Line 12) w.r.t. any 2-permutations selected from n rows of the given transition matrix P i (Line 2). Lines 3∼11 are to 
. We show that this is impossible. If
, we have
. Therefore, we can remove multiple pairs of q j and d j that do not satisfy Inequality (22) at one time.
Theorems 5 and 6 provide insights on transition matrices that lead to the extreme cases of temporal privacy leakage, which are in accordance with Remark 1. Complexity. The time complexity for solving one linearfractional programming problem (Lines 3∼11) w.r.t. two specific rows of the transition matrix is O(n 2 ) because Line 9 may iterate n(n − 1) times in the worst case. The overall time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n 4 ) since there are n(n − 1) permutations of different pairs of q and d.
Algorithm 1 is able to calculate temporal privacy leakage at a time point much more fast than the one using simplex algoirthm. However, it may not be fast enough for real-time tasks, especially, when n is large. This motivates us to design faster algorithms for quantifying temporal privacy leakage.
Quasi-quadratic Algorithm
When Algorithm 1 runs on different time points for continuous data release, we have a constant P i and different α as inputs at each time point. Our observation is that, there may exist some common computations when Algorithm 1 takes different inputs of α. More specifically, we want to know that, for given q and d which are two rows chosen from P i , whether or not the final q and d (when stopping update in Line 11 in Algorithm 1) keep the same for any input of α, so that we can precompute q and d and do not need Lines 5∼11 at next run with a different α. Since q, d and α indicate a specific LFP problem in Equation (19)∼(21), we attempt to directly obtain the q and p in Theorem 4. Unfortunately, we find that such q and d do not keep the same for different α w.r.t. given q and d. However, interestingly we find that, for any input α, there are only several possible pairs of q and d when the update in Lines 6∼11 of Algorithm 1 is terminated, as shown in Theorem 7.
Theorem 7. Let q and d be two vectors drawn from rows of a transition matrix. Assume
5 Without loss of generality, we assume
, then there are only k pairs of q and d that satisfy Inequalities (22) and (23) for given q and d.
case 2:
More interestingly, we find that the values of q and d are monotonically decreasing with the increase of α. That is, when α is increasing from 0 to ∞, the pairs of q and d is transiting from case 1 to case 2,..., until to case k. In other words, the final q and d is constant in a certain range of α. Hence, the mapping from a given α to the optimal solution of a LFP problem w.r.t. q and d can be represented by a piecewise function as shown in Theorem 8.
Theorem 8.
We can represent the function of the optimal solution of LPF problem w.r.t. given q and d by a piecewise function as follows, where q i and d i are the i-th elements of q and d, respectively; and αj = log
. We call α1, ..., α k−1 in the sub-domains as transition points; q 
5. The case of q i = d i is proven in Theorem 5.
For convenience, we let qArr = [q
and aArr = [α k−1 , ..., 0]. Then, qArr, dArr, aArr determine a piecewise function in Equation (25) . Also, we let qM , dM and aM be n(n − 1) × n matrices in which rows are qArr, dArr and aArr w.r.t. distinct 2-permutations of q and d from n rows of P i . In other words, the three matrices determine n(n − 1) piecewise functions.
In the following, we first design Algorithm 2 to obtain qM , dM and aM . We then design Algorithm 3 to utilize the precomputed qM, dM, aM for calculating backward or forward temporal privacy leakage at each time point.
Algorithm 2: Precompute the parameters.
Input: Pi (i.e., P B i or P Permutate q and d in the same way that makes
where q1, ..., q k are larger than 0;
Append qArr, dArr, aArr into new rows of qM, dM ,aM, respectively; 
Algorithm 2 needs O(n
3 ) time for precomputing the parameters qM, dM and aM, which only needs to be run one time and can be done offline. Algorithm 3 for calculating privacy leakage at each time point needs O(n 2 log n) time.
Sub-linear Algorithm
In this section, we further design a sub-linear privacy leakage quantification algorithm by investigating how to generate a function of L(α), so that, given an arbitrary α, we can directly calculate the privacy loss.
Corollary 3.
Temporal privacy loss function L(α) can be represented as a piecewise function: max q,d∈Pi log f q,d (α). . Each line represents a piecewise function f q,d (α) w.r.t. distinct pairs of q and d chosen from P i . Accoding to the definition of BPL and FPL, L(α) function is a piecewise function whose value is not less than any other functions for any α, e.g., the bold line in Figure 4 . The pentagram, which is not any transition point, indicates an intersection of two piecewise functions. Now, the challenge is how to find the "top" function which is larger than or equal to other piecewise functions. A simple idea is to compare the piecewise functions in every sub-domains. First, we list all transition points α 1 , ..., α m of n(n − 1) functions f q,d (α) w.r.t. distinct pairs of q and d (i.e., all distinct values in aM); then, we find the "top" piecewise function on each range between two consecutive transition points, which requires computation time O(n 3 ). Despite the complexity, this idea may not be correct because two piecewise functions may have an intersection between two consecutive transition points, such as the pentagram shown in Figure 4 . Hence, we need a way to find such additional transition points. Our finding is that, if the top function is the same one at a 1 and a 2 , then it is also the top function for any α ∈ [a 1 , a 2 ], which is formalized as the following theorem. (a 1 , a m 
//initialize vectors. Complexity. The complexity of Algorithm 5 for calculating privacy leakage at one time point is O(log n), which makes it very efficient even for large n and T . Algorithm 4 itself requires O(n 2 log n + m log m) time where m is the amount of transition points in [a 1 , a m ], and its parameters qM, dM and aM need to be calculated by Algorithm 2 which requires O(n 3 ) time; hence, in total, generating L(·) needs O(n 3 + m log m) times, which is one-time computation and can be done offline. 
BOUNDING TEMPORAL PRIVACY LEAKAGE
In this section, we design two privacy budget allocation strategies that can be used to convert a traditional DP mechanism into one protecting against TPL. We first investigate the upper bound of BPL and FPL. We have demonstrated that BPL and FPL may increase over time as shown in Figure 3 . A natural question is that: is there a limit of BPL and FPL over time. Example 5 (The supremum of BPL over time). Suppose that M t satisfies -DP at each time point. In Figure 5 , it shows the maximum BPL w.r.t. different and different transition matrices of P B i . In (a) and (b), the supremum does not exist. In (c) and (d), we can calculate the supremum using Theorem 10. The results are in line with the ones from computing BPL step by step at each time point using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 6: Find Supermum of BPL or FPL.
Input: t ; qM; dM. Output: the supremum of BPL or FPL over time, q, d 1 sup = 0; q = 0; d = 0 2 foreach qc ∈ qM, dc ∈dM do 3 Calculate a candidate supc using Theorem 10 ; Algorithm 6 for finding supreme of BPL or FPL is correct because, according to Theorem 7, all possible q and d that give the maximum value in Equation (24) are in the matrices qM and dM . Algorithm 6 is useful not only for designing privacy budget allocation strategies in this section, but also for setting an appropriate parameter a m as the input of Algorithm 4 because we will show in experiments that a larger a m makes Algorithm 4 time-consuming (while, too small a m may result in failing to calculate privacy leakage from L(α) if the input α may be larger than a m ).
Achieving α-DP T by limiting upper bound. We now design a privacy budget allocation strategy utilizing Theorem 10 to bound TPL. Theorem 10 tells us that, if it is not the strongest temporal correlation (i.e., d = 0 and q = 1), we may bound BPL or FPL within a desired value by allocating an appropriate privacy budget to a traditional DP mechanism at each time point. In other words, we want a constant t that guarantee the supremum of TPL, which is equal to the sum of the supremum of BPL and the supremum of BPL subtracting t by Equation (11), will not larger than α. Based on this idea, we design Algorithm 7 for solving such t . Achieving α-DP T by privacy leakage quantification. Algorithm 7 allocates privacy budgets in a conservative way: when T is short, the privacy leakage may not be increased to the supremum. We now design Algorithm 8 to overcome this drawback. Observing the supremum of backward privacy loss in Figure 5(c)(d) , BPL at the first time point is much less than the supremum. Similarly, it is easy to see that FPL at the last time point is much less than its supremum. Hence, we attempt to allocate more privacy budgets to M 1 and M T so that the temporal privacy leakage at every time points are exactly equal to the desired level. Specifically, if we want that BPL at two consecutive time points are exactly the same value α B , i.e., BP L(M t ) = BP L(M t+1 ) = α B , we can derive that t = t+1 for t ≥ 2 (it is true for t = 1 only when L B (·) = 0). Applying the same logic to FPL, we have a new strategy for allocating privacy budgets: assigning larger privacy budgets at time points 1 and T , and constant values at time 
Combing (i) and (iii), we have Equation (26); Combing (ii) and (iii), we have Equation (27) .
Based on the above idea, we design Algorithm 8 to solve α B and α F . Since α B should be in [0, α], we heuristically initialize α B with 0.5 * α in Line 3 and then use binary search to find appropriate α B and α F that satisfy Equations (26) and (27) . 
Algorithm 8:
Achieving α-DPT by quantification Input: P B i and P F i ; α (desired privacy level for user i)7 a F = α − L B ; //Equation (26). 8 Find L F by Algorithm 5 with a F with qM F , dM F , aM F , = 0; 9 if L F + a B = α then bingo = true 10 else if L F + a B < α then a B = a B + range //Equation (27).
11
else a B = a B − range 12 while bingo == f alse
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we design experiments for the following: (1) verifying the runtime and correctness of our privacy leakage quantification algorithms, (2) investigating the impact of the temporal correlations on privacy leakage and (3) evaluating the data release Algorithms 7 and 8. We implemented all the algorithms 6 in Matlab2017b and conducted the experiments on a machine with an Intel Core i7 2.6 GHz CPU and 16G RAM running macOS High Sierra.
Runtime of Privacy Quantification Algorithms
In this section, we compare the runtime of our algorithms with IBM ILOG CPLEX 7 , which is a well-known software for solving optimization problems, e.g., the linear-fractional programming problem (19)∼(21) in our setting.
For verifying the correctness of three privacy quantifying algorithms, Algorithm 1, Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 5, we generate 100 random transition matrices with dimension size n = 30 and comparing the calculation results with the one solving LFP problem using CPLEX. We verified that all results obtained from our algorithms are identical to the one using CPLEX w.r.t. the same transition matrix.
For testing the runtime of our algorithms, we run them 30 times with randomly generated transition matrices, and run CPLEX one time (because it is very time-consuming), and then calculate the average runtime for each of them. Since Algorithm 3 needs parameters that are precomputed by Algorithm 2, and Algorithm 5 needs L(·) that can be obtained using Algorithm 4, we also test the runtime of these precomputations. The results are shown in Figure 6 .
Runtime vs. n. In Figures 6(a) and (b) , we show the runtime of privacy quantification algorithms and precomputation algorithms, respectively, In Figure 6 (a), each algorithm takes inputs of α = 0.1 and n × n random probability matrices. The runtime of all algorithms increase along with n because the number of variables in our LFP problem is n. The proposed Algorithms 1, 3 and 5 significantly outperform CPLEX. In Figure 6 (b), we test precomputation procedures. We observed that all algorithms are increasing with n, but Algorithm 4 is more susceptible to a m . Algorithm 4 with a larger a m results in higher runtime because it performs binary search in [0, a m ]. This is in line with our complexity 6 . Souce code: https://github.com/brahms2013/TPL 7. http://www-01.ibm.com/software/commerce/optimization/cplexoptimizer/. We use version 12.7.1. analysis, which shows the complexity of Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 4 are O(n 3 ) and O(n 2 log n + m log m), respectively. Runtime vs. T . In Figure 6 (c), we test the runtime of each privacy quantification algorithm integrated with their precomputations over different length of time points. We want to know how can we benefit from these precomputations over time. All algorithms take inputs of 100 × 100 matrices and t = 0.1 for each time point t. The parameters of Algorithm 4 need to be initialized by Algorithm 2, so we take them as an integrated module along with Algorithm 5. It shows that, Algorithm 1 runs fast if T is small. Algorithm 3 becomes the most preferable if T is in [5, 300] . However, when T is larger than 300, Algorithm 5 with its precomputation (Algorithm 4 with am = (T + 1) * t which is the worst case of supremum) is the fast one and its runtime is almost constant with the increase of T . Therefore, there is no best algorithm in efficiency without a known T , and we can choose appropriate algorithm according to T .
Runtime vs. α. In Figure 6 (d), we show that, a larger previous BPL (or the next FPL), i.e., α, may lead to higher runtime of Algorithm 1, whereas other algorithms are relatively stable for varying α. The reason is that, when α is large, Algorithm 1 may take more time in Lines 9 and 10 for updating each pair of q j ∈ q + and d j ∈ d + to satisfy Inequality (22) . An update in Line 10 is more likely to occur due to a large α because
is increasing with α. However, such growth of runtime along with α will not last so long because the update happens n times in the worse case. As shown in Figure 6 (b), when α > 10, the runtime of Algorithm 1 becomes stable.
Impact of Temporal Correlations on TPL
In this section, for the ease of exposition, we only present the impact of temporal correlations on BPL because the growth of BPL and FPL are in the same way but in the reversed directions on the timeline.
The setting of temporal correlations. To evaluate if our privacy loss quantification algorithms can perform well under different degrees of temporal correlations, we find a way to generate the transition matrices to eliminate the effect of different correlation estimation algorithms or datasets. First, we generate a transition matrix indicating the "strongest" correlation that contains probability 1.0 in its diagonal cells (this type of transition matrix will lead to an upper bound of TPL). Then, we perform Laplacian smoothing [24] to uniformize the probabilities of P i (the uniform transition matrix will lead to an low bound of TPL). Let p jk be an element at the jth row and kth column of the matrix P i . The uniformized probabilitiesp jk are generated using Equation (28), where s is a positive parameter that controls the degrees of uniformity of probabilities in each row. Hence, a smaller s means stronger temporal correlation. We note that, different s are only comparable under the same n.
We examined s values ranging from 0.005 to 1 and set n to 50 and 200. Let ε be the privacy budget of M t at each time point. We test ε = 1 and 0.1. The results are shown in Figure 7 and are summarized as follows.
Privacy Leakage vs. s. Figure 7 shows that the privacy leakage caused by a non-trivial temporal correlation will increase over time, and such growth first increases sharply and then remains stable because it is gradually close to its supremum. The increase caused by a stronger temporal correlations (i.e., smaller s) is steeper, and the time for the increase is longer. Consequently, stronger correlations result in higher privacy leakage. Comparing Figures 7(a) and (b), we found that 0.1-DP significantly delayed the growth of privacy leakage. Taking s = 0.005, for example, the noticeable increase continues for almost 8 timestamps when ε = 1 (Figures 7(a) ), whereas it continues for approximately 80 timestamps when ε = 0.1 (Figures 7(b) ). However, after a sufficient long time, the privacy leakage in the case of ε = 0.1 is not substantially lower than that of ε = 1 under stronger temporal correlations. This is because, although the privacy leakage is eliminated at each time point by setting a small privacy budget, the adversaries can eventually learn sufficient information from the continuous releases.
Privacy Leakage vs. ε.
Privacy Leakage vs. n. Under the same s, TPL is smaller when n (dimension of the transition matrix) is larger, as shown in the lines s = 0.005 with n = 50 and n = 200 of Figure 7 . This is because the transition matrices tend to be uniform (weaker correlations) when the dimension is larger.
In conclusion, the experiments reveal that our quantification algorithms can flexibly respond to different degrees of temporal correlations. 
Evaluation of Data Releasing Algorithms
In this section, we first show a visualization of privacy allocation of Algorithms 7 and 8, then we compare the data utility in terms of Laplace noise. Figure 8 shows an example of budget allocation, w.r.t. It is easy to see that Algorithm 8 has better data utility because it exactly achieves the desired privacy level. Figure 9 shows the data utility of Algorithms 7 and 8 with 2-DP T . We calculate the absolute value of the Laplace noise with the allocated budgets (as shown in Figure 8 ). Higher value of noise indicates lower data utility. In Figure  9 (a), we test the data utility under backward and forward temporal correlation both with parameter s = 0.001, which means relatively strong correlation. It shows that, when T is short, Algorithm 8 outperforms Algorithm 7. In Figure  9 (b), we investigate the data utility under different degree of correlations. The dash line indicates the absolute value of Laplace noise if no temporal correlation exists (privacy budget is 2). It is easy to see that the data utility significantly decays under strong correlation s = 0.01.
RELATED WORK
Several studies have questioned whether differential privacy is valid for correlated data. Kifer and Machanavajjhala [25] first raised the important issue that differential privacy may not guarantee privacy if adversaries know the data correlations between tuples. They [25] argued that it is not possible to ensure any utility in addition to privacy without making assumptions about the data-generating distribution and the background knowledge available to an adversary. To this end, they proposed a general and customizable privacy framework called PufferFish [26] , in which the potential secrets, discriminative pairs, and data generation need to be explicitly defined. Song et al. [27] proposed Wasserstein mechanism which applies to any general Pufferfish framework. Yang et al. [14] investigated differential privacy on correlated tuples described using a proposed Gaussian correlation model. The privacy leakage w.r.t. adversaries with specified prior knowledge can be efficiently computed. Zhu et al. [28] proposed correlated differential privacy by defining the sensitivity of queries on correlated data. Liu et al. [15] proposed dependent differential privacy by introducing dependence coefficients for analyzing the sensitivity of different queries under probabilistic dependences between tuples. Most of the above works focus on correlations between users in the database, i.e., user-user correlations, whereas we deal with the correlation among single user's data at different time points, i.e., temporal correlations.
On the other hand, it is still controversial [29] what should be the guarantee of DP on correlated data. Li et al. [29] proposed Personal Data Principle for clarifying the privacy guarantee of DP. It states that an individual's privacy is not violated if no personal data about the individual is used. By doing this, one can ignore any correlation between this individual's data and other data in the dataset, i.e.,useruser correlations. If we apply Personal Data Principle to the setting of continuous data release, event-level privacy is not a good fit for protecting individual's privacy because the data at each time point is only a part of individual's data in the database; hence we should use user-level privacy. Our work shares the same insight with Personal Data Principle on this point: our analysis reveals that the privacy loss of event-level privacy may increase over time under temporal correlation, while the guarantee of user-privacy is as expected. We also note that, when the data stream is infinite or the end of data release is unknown, we can only resort event-level privacy or w-event privacy [7] . Hence, it is necessary to investigate how to guarantee a desired level of event-level privacy under temporal correlations.
Dwork et al. first studied differential privacy under continual observation and proposed event-level/user-level privacy [4] [5] . The previous studies in this setting mainly focused on the problems of high dimension [1] [8], infinite sequence [30] [31] [7] , and real-time publishing [6] [32] . None of them addressed the problem of event-level privacy under temporal correlations. To the best of our knowledge, no study has reported the risk of differential privacy under temporal correlations for the continuous aggregate release setting. Although [17] have considered a similar adversarial model in which the adversaries have prior knowledge of temporal correlations represented by Markov chains, they proposed a new location privacy notion extending DP and a mechanism incorporating temporal correlation for release a private location, whereas we focus on the scenario of continuous aggregate release with DP.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we quantified the risk of differential privacy under temporal correlations by formalizing, analyzing and calculating the privacy loss against adversaries who have knowledge of temporal correlations. Our analysis shows the privacy loss of event-level privacy may increase over time, while the privacy guarantee of user-level privacy is as expected. We design fast algorithms for quantifying temporal privacy leakage which enables private data release in real-time. This work opens up interesting future research directions, such as modeling temporal correlations with other type of models, and combining our methods with the previous studies that neglected the effect of temporal correlations in order to bound the temporal privacy leakage. Therefore, the theorem follows when j = 1. According to Definition 9, the overall privacy leakage of Therefore, the theorem follows when j ≥ 2.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We need Dinkelbach's Theorem and Lemma 3 in our proof.
Theorem 11 (Dinkelbach's Theorem [33] ). In a linearfractional programming problem, suppose that the variable vector is x and the objective function is represented as
. Vector x * is an optimal solution if and only if an optimal solution is as follows: if ki > 0, let xi = e Proof. Without loss of generality, we suppose that the smallest value in the optimal solution is x n . Let y j be 
Proof of Theorem 4. We first prove that, under the conditions shown in Theorem 4, i.e., Inequalities (22) and (23), an optimal solution of the problem (19) ∼ (21) is:
where m is a positive real number.
In combination with Dinkelbach's Theorem, we rewrite our objective function as
in which Q(x) = qx and D(x) = dx. Substituting x * of Equation (30) 
Because D(x * ) > 0, to prove x * in (30) is an optimal solution for
, we only need to prove the maximum value of the following equation is equal to 0.
We expand the above equation as follows.
Eqn.(33)
By Equations (31) and ( where m is a positive real number. We obtain the maximum value in Equation (33) .
Therefore, by Dinkelbach's Theorem, x * is an optimal solution for the problem (19)∼ (21) . Substituting them into the objective function (19) , we obtain the maximum value 
APPENDIX C PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
Proof. The proof is by contradiction.
First, assume that q = d, i.e., This leads to a contradiction to Inequality (23) 
APPENDIX D PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
Proof. The corollary is true because of Equation (24) .
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Proof. It is clear that, if q i = d i for i ∈ [1, n] in q and d, Line 9 in Algorithm 1 is always true so that the flag update is alway true until all bits are removed from q + and d + . That is to say, q + and d + are empty. Hence, in this case, Algorithm 1 will be terminated with empty q + and d + , which result in q = d = 0. Since for any two rows q and d in the transition matrix P i , we have q = d = 0, it follows L(·) = 0.
APPENDIX F PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Proof. For such two rows q and d in P i that satisfy q i = 1 and d i = 0, it is easy to see that Algorithm 1 results in q = 1, d = 0 and the flag update is false. Hence, we have a maximum solution of α (i.e., α B t−1 or α F t+1 ) for such LFP problem. Since the maximum solution of LFP problem w.r.t. any two other rows in P i cannot be larger than α, it follows that, in this case, L(·) = 1 * ·.
APPENDIX G PROOF OF THEOREM 7
Proof. According to Corollary 2, we have
d(e α )+1 > 1 because of q > d. By the pigeonhole principle, there only exists k cases as shown in the theorem. We only need to pove that the statements about q and d for each case are true. In case k, it is clear that
. In case k − 1, the final q + and d + are impossible to include {q 3 , · · · , q n } and {d 3 , · · · , d n }, respectively; otherwise, it violates Inequality (22) . Additionally, the final q + and d + in case k − 1 are impossible to exclude any elements in {q 1 , q 2 } and {d 1 , d 2 }, respectively; otherwise, it violates Inequality (23) . Similarly, we can verfiy all other cases are true.
